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Abstract
Purpose – The aim of this paper is to evaluate contrasting ways of tackling self-employment in the informal
sector. Conventionally, the participation of the self-employed in the informal sector has been viewed as a
rational economic decision taken when the expected benefits outweigh the costs, and thus enforcement
authorities have sought to change the benefit-to-cost ratio by increasing the punishments and chances of being
caught. Recently, however, neo-institutional theory has viewed such endeavor as a product of a lack of vertical
trust (in government) and horizontal trust (in others) and pursued trust-building strategies to nurture voluntary
compliance.
Design/methodology/approach – To evaluate these contrasting policy approaches, data are reported from
special Eurobarometer survey 92.1 conducted in 2019 across 28 European countries (the 27 member states of
the European Union and the United Kingdom) involving over 27,565 interviews.
Findings –Using probit regression analysis, the finding is that the likelihood of participation in informal self-
employment is not associated with the level of expected punishments and chances of being caught, but is
significantly associated with the level of vertical and horizontal trust, with a greater likelihood of participation
in informal self-employment when there is lower vertical and horizontal trust.
Practical implications – The outcome is a call for state authorities to shift away from the use of repressive
policymeasures that increase the penalties and chances of being caught and toward trust-building strategies to
nurture voluntary compliance. How this can be achieved is explored.
Originality/value – Evidence is provided to justify a shift toward seeking trust-building strategies by state
authorities to engender voluntary compliance among the self-employed operating in the informal sector in
Europe.
Keywords Tax evasion, Informal economy, Tax morale, Institutional theory, Public policy, Europe
Paper type Research paper
Introduction
In this paper, the self-employed operating in the informal sector refers to those working on an
own-account basis who do not register their business venture and/or declare all their paid
activities to the authorities for tax, social security and/or labor law purposes (Ketchen,
Ireland, & Webb, 2014; Khan, 2017; Siqueira, Webb & Bruton, 2016; Williams & Martinez-
Perez, 2014a, b; Williams, Martinez-Perez & Kedir, 2017). The ILO (2018) has estimated that,
globally, 86.1% of all own-account workers operate in the informal sector, as do eight out of
ten enterprises (ILO, 2020). Consequently, this issue of tackling self-employment in the
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(European Commission, 2016; ILO, 2015; OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2019) and national
governments in Europe and elsewhere (e.g. ILO, 2018, 2020; Williams, 2019). This is due to a
growing recognition of its negative impacts on workers, businesses and the wider society.
Formal enterprises suffer unfair competition from informal enterprises (Leal Ordo~nez, 2014;
OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2019); the self-employed in the informal sector suffer poorer
working conditions and find it difficult to access capital to grow their businesses (Andrews,
Caldera Sanchez, Johansson, 2011; European Commission, 2007; Loyaza, 2018; Williams &
Horodnic, 2019); customers lack legal recourse when poor quality products and services are
provided (OECD, 2017; Williams & Horodnic, 2017a); and governments lose tax revenue that
could otherwise be used to provide public goods and services (Bajada& Schneider, 2005; ILO,
2018; World Bank, 2019). Therefore, this paper aims to evaluate how informal self-
employment can be tackled.
This will advance knowledge by reporting the results of an extensive survey of a
representative sample of the European population conducted in late 2019 to empirically test
two competing hypotheses regarding participation in informal self-employment. On the one
hand, the survey empirically tests the conceptualization of informal self-employment as a
rational economic decision that has resulted in a repressive policy approach that changes the
benefit-to-cost ratio confronting the self-employed by increasing the punishments and
chances of being caught. On the other hand, it empirically tests the emergent neo-institutional
theoretical depiction that this endeavor is derived from a low vertical trust (in government)
and a low horizontal trust (in others) and has adopted trust-building strategies. The resultant
policy advance seeks to uncover the need for state authorities to shift away from increasing
the fines and chances of being caught and toward trust-building strategies.
To accomplish this, the next section reviews the contrasting repressive and trust-building
policy approaches and discusses the development of the hypotheses that can be tested. The
third section presents the methodology and data used in the study, namely a probit
regression analysis of 27,565 interviews conducted on a representative sample of the
European population in 28 countries. The fourth section reports the finding that informal self-
employment is not a rational economic decision that can be prevented by increasing the
sanctions and chances of detection; rather, it is driven by low vertical and horizontal trust and
requires trust-building strategies. The fifth and final section discusses the implications for
theory and policy along with the limitations of this study and recommendations for future
research.
Tackling informal self-employment: literature review and hypothesis
development
To date, the extensive literature on self-employment in the informal sector has variously
documented its magnitude and cross-national prevalence (ILO, 2018, 2020; Williams, 2017;
Williams et al., 2017), themacro-level conditions associatedwith its variable prevalence cross-
nationally (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Siqueira, Webb & Bruton, 2016; Thai & Turkina,
2014), who engages in this endeavor (Afreh, Rodgers, Vershinina & Williams, 2019; Webb
et al., 2009, 2013; Williams & Gashi, 2020; Williams & Horodnic, 2015) and their motives for
participating in informal self-employment (Maloney, 2004; Perry & Maloney, 2007; Williams
& Round, 2009; Williams, Adom & Horodnic, 2020).
Very little previous scholarship has evaluated the effectiveness of the contrasting policy
approaches for tackling informal self-employment, one notable exception being a study
conducted in the specific and unique institutional context of East-Central Europe (Williams,
2020). To address this, a review was undertaken of two contrasting policy approaches in the
wider literature on tackling tax non-compliance, and the informal economy more generally,
which can be tested to evaluate their relevance when tackling informal self-employment.
FREP
Repressive policy approach
The historical basis of a repressive policy approach is the classical utilitarian theory of crime
developed by Bentham (1788), which construed those criminal acts occur when the benefits of
crime outweigh the expected costs (i.e. the punishment and chances of being caught). This
view was brought to prominence by Becker (1968) in the late 1960s, who asserted that to
ensure that acting legally would be the rational choice; governments would need to increase
the level of punishments and the likelihood of being caught. Within a few years, Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) argued that tax non-compliance would similarly occur if the expected
benefits were greater than the perceived costs. To alter the benefit-to-cost ratio confronting
taxpayers, they argued that state authorities should increase the expected punishments and
the likelihood of being caught.
This repressive policy approach became the dominant policy approach for tackling tax
non-compliance, social contribution evasion and labor law violations used by tax, social
security and labor inspectorates across the globe (Grabiner, 2000; Hasseldine & Li, 1999;
Richardson & Sawyer, 2001; Williams, 2019). A legal mandate was given to “enforcement”
authorities (e.g. tax authorities, labor inspectorates) to develop their competencies to detect
and punish those not declaring all their paid activities to the authorities for tax, social security
and/or labor law purposes. Indeed, a 2017 survey of government representatives of 28
countries on the European Commission’s European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work
found that increasing the level of penalties was most commonly ranked as the most effective
and important policymeasure used in their countries for tackling non-compliance followed by
increasing the chances of detection (Williams & Puts, 2017).
However, evidence that this repressive approach is effective at preventing participation in
the informal sector is inconclusive (for a review, seeWilliams&Horodnic, 2020). The findings
vary. Some studies find that increasing the penalties and/or likelihood of being detected
prevents participation in the informal sector (Blackwell, 2010; Kluge & Libman, 2017) and
that improving the chances of detection is more effective than increasing the penalties
(Williams and Horodnic, 2017a, b). Nevertheless, other studies find that these repressive
measures are not significantly related to preventing participation in the informal sector
(Hartl, Hofmann, Gangl, Hartner-Tiefenthaler & Kirchler, 2015). Several studies find that
increasing these repressive measures leads to an even greater likelihood of participation in
the informal sector due to the negative impacts on the social contract between citizens and the
state (Chang& Lai, 2004; Hofmann et al., 2017; Kaplanoglou & Rapanos, 2015; Murphy, 2008;
Murphy & Harris, 2007). Nevertheless, to date, there have been no evaluations as to whether
this repressive policy approach prevents informal self-employment. Therefore, the following
hypothesis can be tested:
Repressive policy approach hypothesis (H1): Increasing the perceived punishments and chances of
being caught reduces the likelihood of informal self-employment, ceteris paribus.
H1a. Increasing the perceived punishments reduces the likelihood of informal self-
employment, ceteris paribus.
H1b. Increasing the perceived chances of being caught reduces the likelihood of informal
self-employment, ceteris paribus.
Trust-building policy approach
Over the past decade or so, an understanding has emerged that even when the benefits of
participating in the informal sector outweigh the costs, many do not make the rational
economic decision to participate in the informal sector (Alm, Cherry, Jones & McKee, 2010;




economic actor. To explain their adherence to the laws and regulations, even when the
rational economic decision would be to not do so, a view has emerged that the decision about
whether to participate in the informal sector is related to the actors’ level of vertical trust (in
the state) and horizontal trust (in each other to act legitimately).
This view of participation in the informal sector is theoretically grounded in a variant of
institutional theory (Baumol & Blinder, 2008; Denzau & North, 1994; North, 1990). In this
variant of institutional theory, institutions represent the rules of the game that govern,
monitor, enforce, support and prescribe human behavior. Every society possesses both
formal institutions, manifested in the laws, codes and regulations, which are the legal rules of
the game and informal institutions manifested in the unwritten rules of the game that exist in
socially shared norms, values and beliefs about what is acceptable (Helmke & Levitsky,
2004). Viewed through this lens, formal self-employment is own-account economic activity
that adheres to the formal rules of the game, informal self-employment is own-account
economic activity that occurs outside these formal rules but adheres to the informal rules
about what is acceptable, and criminal forms of self-employment do not adhere to either the
formal or informal rules of the game about what is acceptable (De Castro, Khavul & Bruton,
2014; Godfrey, 2011; Kistruck, Webb, Sutter & Bailey, 2015; Siqueira et al., 2016; Webb et al.,
2009, 2013, 2014; Welter, Smallbone & Pobol, 2015).
Based on this conceptualization, self-employment in the informal sector occurs when the
own-account workers’ social norms, values and beliefs about what is acceptable are not in
congruence with the formal rules (Dau & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2014; Fuentas-Contreras,
Mungaray-Lagarda, & Ramirez-Urquidy, 2020; Godfrey, 2015; Webb et al., 2009; Williams
and Shahid, 2016; Williams et al., 2015, 2017). This lack of congruence, or asymmetry, is
explained as a direct outcome of a lack of vertical trust (in formal institutions), measured in
relation to the self-employed in terms of their intrinsic motivation to pay taxes, or what is
often referred to as tax morale (Alm and Torgler, 2006, 2011; Torgler & Schneider, 2007;
Torgler, 2011). Lower tax morale (i.e. a proxy measure of less vertical trust in the state) leads
to a higher probability of participation in informal self-employment (Williams & Shahid,
2016; Williams et al., 2017). Hence, in this trust-based policy approach, the policy aims to
improve vertical trust in the state to promote voluntary compliance with the formal rules of
the game.
Until now, institutional theorists, particularly when explaining participation in the
informal sector and informal self-employment, have focused on the lower levels of vertical
trust. Little attention has been given to the horizontal trust. Yet, even a moment’s reflection
leads to the realization that if the self-employed view their competitors as operating in the
informal sector, this might also lead them to do so. Even if no such studies have specifically
focused on the self-employed, studies of taxpayer compliance more generally support this
viewpoint. Laboratory experiments of taxpayers reveal that compliance is conditionally
based on their perceptions of the behavior of other taxpayers (Alm, 1999; Chang & Lai,
2004; Lefebvre, Pestieau, Riedl & Villeval, 2015; Mendoza Rodriguez & Wielhouwer, 2015;
Narsa, Laksmana, & Putong, 2016; Traxler, 2010). If taxpayers believe that there is
widespread compliance, they are also more likely to be compliant (Alm, 1999, 2012).
However, if taxpayers believe that non-compliance is common, they are more likely to be
non-compliant (Hallsworth, List, Metcalfe & Vlaev, 2017). For instance, a laboratory
experiment of taxpayers in Belgium, France and the Netherlands discovered that if
taxpayers were given information that the level of compliance was high, they reacted by
complying (Lefebvre et al., 2015). It is not known whether the participation of the self-
employed in the informal sector is also conditionally based on the perceived behavior of
others (i.e. their level of horizontal trust).
To evaluate this policy approach that the participation of the self-employed in the informal
sector is related to the level of their vertical and horizontal trust and which focuses on
FREP
building vertical and horizontal trust to tackle this phenomenon, the following hypothesis can
be tested:
Trust-building policy approach hypothesis (H2): Higher levels of vertical and horizontal trust reduce
the likelihood of informal self-employment, ceteris paribus.
H2a. Higher levels of vertical trust reduce the likelihood of informal self-employment,
ceteris paribus.
H2b. Higher levels of horizontal trust reduce the likelihood of informal self-employment,
ceteris paribus.
Combining the repressive and trust-building policy approaches
Most scholars have advocated for using one of these two policy approaches. However, a small
but growing minority assert that using both is more effective. These analysts have adopted
one of two approaches, distinguished by how they temporally sequence these policy
measures. First, there is a “responsive regulation” approach, which depicts a regulatory
pyramid. At the bottom are policy measures to improve vertical (and horizontal) trust, which
are used first; at the top are the policy measures of sanctions and improving the risk of
detection, which are used only as a last resort and are targeted at those for whom trust-
buildingmeasures have failed to elicit compliant behavior (Braithwaite, 2002, 2009; Job, Stout
& Smith, 2007).
Second, there is a “slippery slope” approach, or what is sometimes called a “full policy
operationalization” (European Platform Tackling Undeclared Work, 2018). This asserts
that the most effective approach is for state authorities to use both the repressive and
trust-building policy measures in tandem (Kastlunger, Lozza, Kirchler & Schabmann,
2013; Khurana & Diwan, 2014; Kirchler et al., 2008, 2014; Prinz, Muehlbacher & Kirchler,
2013; Wahl, Kastlunger & Kirchler, 2010). Based mainly on laboratory experiments, these
scholars claim that compliance is higher when the repressive and trust-building measures
are employed concurrently (Kogler, Batrancea, Nichita, Pantya, Belianin &Kirchler, 2013;
Muehlbacher, Kirchler & Schwarzenberger, 2011; Williams & Horodnic, 2017a).
Hence, it is important to evaluate not only whether repressive or trust-building policy
measures are effective in preventing self-employment in the informal sector, but also whether
it is effective to combine some or all the repressive and trust-building measures. However,
using these together may have interaction effects, and these need to be understood. For
example, using punishments and increasing the chances of being caught may have different
impacts at different levels of vertical trust. Increasing the sanctions and chances of being
caught could decrease the likelihood of informal self-employment when vertical trust is low,
but it could result in a higher likelihood of informal self-employmentwhen vertical trust is due
to the resultant breakdown of the social contract between the state and the self-employed
(Chang & Lai, 2004). As such, the following hypotheses can be tested:
Impacts of the level of vertical trust on the effectiveness of repressive policies hypothesis (H3): The
impacts of repressive policies on the likelihood of informal self-employment vary by the level of
vertical trust, ceteris paribus.
H3a. The impacts of the perceived punishments on the likelihood of informal self-
employment vary by the level of vertical trust, ceteris paribus.
H3b. The impacts of increasing the perceived chances of being caught on the likelihood of




Impacts of the level of horizontal trust on the effectiveness of repressive policies hypothesis (H4): The
impacts of repressive policies on the likelihood of informal self-employment vary by the level of
horizontal trust, ceteris paribus.
H4a. The impacts of the perceived punishments on the likelihood of informal self-
employment vary by the level of horizontal trust, ceteris paribus.
H4b. The impacts of increasing the perceived chances of being caught on the likelihood of
informal self-employment vary by the level of horizontal trust, ceteris paribus.
Methodology
Data
To evaluate these hypotheses, this paper reports on data from 27,565 interviews conducted in
28 European countries (the 27 European Union member states and the UK) for the special
Eurobarometer survey 92.1 conducted in September 2019. All the interviews were
undertaken in the national language with adults 15 years of age and older, as is standard
practice with Eurobarometer surveys. To achieve a representative sample, a multi-stage
random (probability) sampling methodology was used. This ensured that a representative
sample was achieved for the variables of gender, age, region and locality size in every nation.
Variables
To evaluate the relationship between participation in informal self-employment and these
repressive and trust-building policy measures, the dependent variable is a binary variable
with a value of 1 for respondents who answered “yes” to the question of “Have you yourself
carried out any undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months?” and then answered the
follow-up question of “Would you describe your undeclared paid activities as. . .” with the
answer “Undertaken on your own account”; otherwise, a value of 0 was applied (e.g. if they
stated they did not participate in undeclared work, or that it was waged employment for an
employer, or refused to answer). Regarding the value of 0, this could not be solely applied to
people currently in the labor force because an analysis of the descriptive results revealed that
informal self-employment was undertaken by many different groups, including people who
were retired, those pursuing full-time education and those that were not employed. Therefore,
the 0 value needed to be applicable to the whole population sample.
Table 1 presents the explanatory and control variables used to analyze whether
participation in informal self-employment is associated with the perceived level of penalties
and risk of detection and vertical and horizontal trust.
Analytical methods
Probit regression analysis is used to test hypotheses about the relationship between a
categorical dependent variable and one or more categorical or continuous independent
variables (Greene, 2018). Consequently, it was used in this study. The maximum likelihood









where f is the standard cumulative normal and ωj denotes the optional weights. lnL is
maximized. Using probit analysis, the following model is adopted:
FREP
PrðYj ≠ 0jxjÞ ¼ fðxjβÞ
The dependent variable of the model ðYjÞ is binary, which represents participation in
informal self-employment; x represents the explanatory variables, including the control
variables, which are expected penalty, detection risk, level of tax morality, level of horizontal
trust, gender, age, people 15þ years in own household, children, difficulties paying bills and
area of residence. Moreover, the interaction term is used to investigate themoderating effects.
Results
As seen in Table 2, in 2019, just over 2%of the European citizens surveyed reported that they
had participated in self-employment in the informal sector in the 12 months prior to the
Variables Definition
Expected punishment A dummy variable for the expected punishment associated with participation
in informal self-employment with a value of 0 for normal tax or social security
contributions due and a value of 1 for normal tax or social security
contributions due, plus a fine or prison
Chances of being caught A dummy variable for the perceived chances of being caught. A value of 0 for a
very small or fairly small risk and a value of 1 for fairly high or very high risk
Tax morale Constructed index of the self-reported acceptability of participating in the
informal sector. Participants were asked to rate the acceptability of five
different forms of participation in the informal sector on a 10-point Likert scale
(where 1 is absolutely unacceptable and 10 is absolutely acceptable), namely:
an individual is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the
payment received to the tax or social security authorities even though it should
be declared; a firm is hired by a household for work and it does not declare the
payment received to the tax or social security authorities; a firm is hired by
another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to the tax or social
security authorities; a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages
paid to him/her are not officially declared, and someone evades taxes by not
declaring or only partially declaring his/her income. An aggregate tax morale
index for each individual was then constructed by collating the participants’
responses to these five questions
Horizontal trust A dummy variable with a value of 1 for those who know others who participate
in the informal economy and a value of 0 otherwise
Gender A dummy variable with the following values: 0 for women and 1 for men
Age A continuous variable indicating the exact age of a respondent
Marital status Categorical variable grouping respondents by their marital status with the
following values: 1 for (re)married, 2 for single livingwith a partner, 3 for single,
4 for divorced/separated, 5 for widow
People 15þ years in own
household
A categorical variable for people 15þ years of age in the respondent`s
household (including the respondent) with the following values: 1 for one
person, 2 for two persons, 3 for three or more persons
Children A dummy variable for the presence of children up to 14 years of age in the
household with a value of 0 for individuals with no children and a value of 1 for
those who have children
Financial difficulties A categorical variable for the respondent’s difficulties in paying bills with the
following values: 1 for having difficulties most of the time, 2 for having
difficulties occasionally and 3 for having difficulties almost never/never
Area A categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with the
following values: 1 for rural area or village, 2 for small ormiddle-sized town and
3 for large town
Table 1.





survey. In 2019, there were 379.3 million European Union (EU) citizens aged over 15 years old
(Eurostat, 2020a). Extrapolating from this survey’s finding, this means that approximately
8.7 million citizens can be estimated to have engaged in informal self-employment in the year
prior to the survey. Given that Eurostat estimates that 32.6 million persons aged 15 to 74 in
the EU were self-employed in 2019 (Eurostat, 2020b), this suggests that the 8.7 million
participating in informal self-employment are around one-quarter (26.7%) of the number of




Participation in informal self-employment (%) 2.06 97.94
Expected punishment (%)
Tax or social security contributions due 32 27
Tax or social security contributions þ fine or
prison
68 73
Chances of being caught (%)
Very small/fairly small 75 55
Fairly high/very high 25 45
Tax morale: vertical trust (mean) 3.89 2.42






Age (mean) 43 52
Marital status (%)
Re(married) 40 53





People 15þ years of age in own household
One 28 24
Two 46 51
Three or more 26 25
Children (%)
No children 71 76
Have children 29 24
Area (%)
Rural area or village 38 33
Small or middle-sized town 39 38
Large town 23 29
Difficulties paying bills (%)
Most of the time 17 7
From time to time 27 23
Almost never/never 56 70






people who reported being formally self-employed. As such, they constitute a significant
minority of those engaging in self-employment.
Examining the descriptive findings, those participating in informal self-employment
perceive the expected punishment to be lower than the rest of the population, which perhaps
helps explain their lack of compliance. Those participating in informal self-employment also
perceive the chances of being caught to be lower than the rest of the population, again
suggesting that this might explain their non-compliance. Regarding the issue of vertical trust
(here measured using tax morale), those participating in informal self-employment have
lower average tax morale than the wider population (3.89 compared with 2.42) and a
considerably lower level of horizontal trust than the rest of the population.
Examining who engages in informal self-employment, it was found that men are more
likely than women to do so, as are younger people, single people, single persons living with a
partner, people who are divorced/separated and those with no children. Examining the
differences between rural and urban areas, participation in informal self-employment is more
prevalent in rural areas and villages, and its prevalence declines as the size of the settlement
increases. Participation in informal self-employment is also more common among those who
often have difficulty paying bills; those who almost never or never have difficulties paying
bills are less likely to engage in such an endeavor.
To analyze whether these descriptive findings remain valid when other variables are held
constant, probit estimates of the likelihood of participating in informal self-employment were
obtained (Table 3). It was found that informal self-employment is significantly more likely
among men than women and among younger age groups. Marital status has no significant
association with participation. However, single-person households are significantly more
likely than households with two ormore adults to engage in informal self-employment, whilst
having children or not is not significantly associated with the likelihood of engaging in
informal self-employment. Those having difficulties paying the bills most of the time and
those living in rural areas are significantly more likely to participate in informal self-
employment than those less commonly having financial difficulties and those living in
larger towns.
To evaluate the hypotheses, model 1 reports the relationship between informal self-
employment and punishments, the chances of being caught and vertical and horizontal trust.
The full model (model 2) includes the interaction effects between the repressive and trust-
building measures. Analyzing the results of the full model, no relationship was found
between the perceived punishments and participation in informal self-employment (refuting
H1a). Althoughmodel 1 identifies a significant association between engaging in informal self-
employment and the chances of being caught, as model 2 displays, once the moderating
effects of vertical and horizontal trust are included, the significance of this association
disappears (refuting H1b).
Examining the hypotheses of the trust-building policy approach, there is a strong
significant association between vertical trust and participation in informal self-employment.
The higher the level of vertical trust, measured in terms of taxmorale, the lower the likelihood
of participation in informal self-employment (confirming H2a). This finding is also similar for
horizontal trust. The greater the trust in others to act in a compliant manner, the lower the
likelihood of participation in informal self-employment (confirming H2b).
Analyzing if vertical and horizontal trust moderate the impacts of punishments and the
chances of being caught on participation in informal self-employment, it was found that the
impact of the level of punishments on the likelihood of participation in informal self-
employment does not significantly change based on the level of vertical trust (refuting H3a).
Moreover, it was found that the effects of the expected chances of being caught on the
likelihood of participation in informal self-employment did not significantly vary based on




impact on whether the expected level of punishment and chances of being caught
significantly influence the likelihood of participating in informal self-employment (refuting
H4a and H4b). As a robustness check, we also first calculated the marginal effects, then the
interaction effects for all combinations using Bonferroni adjusted delta methods, which gives
all combinations of interactions and their statistical significance and isolates the interactions
from their individual effects. The results remained the same with no significant associations.
Model 1 Model 2
β (Robust se) β (Robust se)
Expected punishment (tax or social security contributions due)
þ Fine or prison 0.009 (0.049) 0.051 (0.121)
Chances of being caught (Very small/Fairly small)
Fairly high/very high 0.296*** (0.049) 0.129 (0.109)
Vertical trust 0.112*** (0.009) 0.100*** (0.018)
Horizontal trust 0.671*** (0.050) 0.761*** (0.102)
Gender (women)
Men 0.162*** (0.046) 0.160*** (0.045)
Age 0.0119*** (0.0016) 0.012*** (0.002)
Marital status (married)
Single living with a partner & single 0.036 (0.062) 0.032 (0.060)
Divorced or separated & widow 0.047 (0.084) 0.057 (0.065)
People 15þ years in own household (one)
Two 0.116* (0.070) 0.168** (0.067)
Three or more 0.206*** (0.071) 0.243*** (0.068)
Children (no children)
Have children 0.043 (0.056) 0.051 (0.057)
Financial difficulties (most of the time)
From time to time 0.307*** (0.074) 0.305*** (0.074)
Almost never/never 0.374*** (0.067) 0.377*** (0.067)
Area (rural area or village)
Small or middle-sized town 0.081 (0.051) 0.079 (0.051)
Large town 0.240*** (0.058) 0.236*** (0.058)
Interactions
Sanction 3 vertical trust 0.032 (0.020)
Detection 3 vertical trust 0.029 (0.019)
Sanction 3 horizontal trust 0.074 (0.110)
Detection 3 horizontal trust 0.101 (0.104)
Constant 1.6829*** (0.1543) 1.623*** (0.182)
Observations 20,720 20,720
Pseudo R2 0.158 0.159
Log pseudolikelihood 1745.685 1742.752
χ2 520.79 556.84
p> 0.000 0.000
Note(s): Significant at ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. All coefficients are
compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. When multiple imputation techniques are used (10
imputations were simulated through a system of chained equations for every missing value) to address the
missing responses issue, the same variables are significantly associated with informal self-employment. Hence,
data with no imputation is used here to minimize bias. Similarly, when including country dummies as part of
the robustness checks, the results did not change their significance or direction








To evaluate the effectiveness of repressive and trust-building policies in preventing informal
self-employment, this study used data from a 2019 special Eurobarometer survey. No
significant association was found between the repressive policies of increasing the
punishments and the chances of being caught and participation in informal self-
employment. However, there is a strong significant association between building greater
vertical and horizontal trust and a lower likelihood of participating in informal self-
employment.When they are used together, there are no significant interaction effects. Table 4
presents a summary of the findings. In this section, the implications for both explaining and
tackling informal self-employment are discussed.
The outcome advances the theoretical explanations of informal self-employment in three
ways. First, evidence is provided to reject the dominant repressive policy approach based on a
rational economic actor theorization and replace it with a trust-building policy approach
founded on a social actor view of participants. Second, through field-based evidence, it
confirms the validity of recent calls arising from laboratory experiments to extend the trust-
building approach to include horizontal trust. Third, this European survey reveals that there
are no significant interaction effects. Within both policy-making circles (European Platform
Tackling Undeclared Work, 2018; OECD, 2017; ILO, 2015) as well as academia (Khurana &
Diwan, 2014; Kirchler et al., 2008, 2014; Kogler et al., 2013; Muehlbacher et al., 2011; Prinz et al.,
2013; Wahl et al., 2010; Williams & Horodnic, 2017a), there has been an emergent consensus
that the most effective way to tackle the informal economy is to combine the repressive
measures of the rational economic actor perspective with the trust-building approaches of the
social actor perspective. The study discussed in this paper revealed that this is not the case in
Europe in relation to tackling informal self-employment. Future researchwill need to evaluate
whether this finding that the focus should be upon trust-building policy measures is also
valid in other global regions and various individual countries concerning tackling informal
self-employment.
These findings also have important policy implications. For half a century, governments
have adopted the rational economic actor-based repressive policy approach and sought to
Hypothesis Finding
Repressive policy approach (H1)
H1a: Increasing the perceived punishments reduces the likelihood of informal self-employment Rejected
H1b: Increasing the perceived chances of being caught reduces the likelihood of informal self-
employment
Rejected
Trust-building policy approach (H2)
H2a: Higher levels of vertical trust reduce the likelihood of informal self-employment Accepted
H2b: Higher levels of horizontal trust reduce the likelihood of informal self-employment Accepted
Moderating impacts of vertical trust (H3)
H3a: The impacts of the perceived punishments on the likelihood of informal self-employment
vary by the level of vertical trust
Rejected
H3b:The impacts of increasing the perceived chances of being caught on the likelihood of informal
self-employment vary by the level of vertical trust
Rejected
Moderating impacts of horizontal trust (H4)
H4a: The impacts of the perceived punishments on the likelihood of informal self-employment
vary by the level of horizontal trust
Rejected
H4b:The impacts of increasing the perceived chances of being caught on the likelihood of informal








increase the punishments and chances of being caught. Indeed, the legal mandate of most
enforcement authorities (e.g. tax administrations, labor inspectorates, social security
institutions) has been to detect and punish non-compliant. However, this paper reveals the
need for a shift away from this repressive approach and toward a focus on trust-building.
This requires enforcement authorities to acquire new competencies. To identify these, it is
necessary to understand how to improve vertical trust and horizontal trust.
From the perspective of institutional theory, low vertical trust is a direct result and
measure of the non-alignment of the laws, codes and regulations of formal institutions and the
norms, beliefs and values of informal institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990). To
resolve this asymmetry, either the formal institutions or informal institutions can be altered.
Altering the acceptability of participating in informal self-employment (i.e. changing the
informal institutions) requires educational initiatives and awareness-raising campaigns
highlighting either the benefits of formality or the costs of informality targeted at either
suppliers or customers. Many good practice examples of how this can be achieved can be
found on social media under the #EU4FairWork hashtag used in 2020 by the 27 EUmember
states for their awareness-raising campaign that focused on the benefits of formality
(European Commission, 2020). This paper identified the characteristics of the population
groups that campaigns seeking to tackle informal self-employment need to target. At the EU
level, the people with a greater likelihood of participating in informal self-employment are
men, younger people, single-person households, those in villages and rural areas, and those
who, most of the time, have difficulty paying the bills.
However, it can be argued that the asymmetry between formal and informal institutions
will not be resolved and vertical trust will not be improved until changes in the formal
institutions have been implemented. Extrapolating from previous studies of tax compliance,
it is likely that the number of people engaged in informal self-employment will decrease when
citizens believe they are paying their fair share in taxes and social contributions (Molero &
Pujol, 2012), believe they are treated respectfully and impartially by state authorities (Kogler
et al., 2013; Murphy, 2005) and believe that they are receiving the public goods they deserve
(Kogler et al., 2013). Such initiatives replace the “cops and robbers” approach of the repressive
approach, which often constructed citizens as non-compliant deviants who had to be detected
and caught, with more “customer-friendly” state institutions oriented to promoting
procedural and distributive fairness and justice. While modernization of governance is
needed to enhance vertical trust, so too are specific policy measures to make it easier and
beneficial to operate formally, such as simplifying compliance (Alstadsæter & Jacob, 2013)
and regulatory complexity (Richardson, 2006), for instance, state authorities pre-filling tax
returns (Jensen & W€ohlbier, 2012; Kleven, Knudsen, Kreiner, Pedersen & Saez, 2011),
formalization support and advice (Baas, 2012; Baculo, 2006; Bernhard & Wolff, 2011) and
voluntary disclosure initiatives to enable formalization without penalization (Bami, 2020).
In addition to these initiatives to improve vertical trust, there is a need for state authorities
to improve horizontal trust. How this can be achieved is in its infancy. Perhaps, one starting
point for governments is to refrain from publishing data displaying that non-compliance with
tax, social security and labor laws are widespread. This is likely to have negative impacts on
the level of horizontal trust (Williams & Horodnic, 2021). Instead, messages need to convey
the extensiveness of compliance. When applying research on which types of notification
letters are most effective at eliciting compliant behavior, perhaps the recipients of the
messages need to receive information on the widespread compliance in their particular
occupation, sector of activity and locality (Hallsworth et al., 2017). Nevertheless, future
research is required on how to most effectively convey the compliant social norms to the peer
groups of targeted recipients. This is not the only issue requiring further research.
Several limitations to this study open up the opportunity for further research. First, and as
identified above, there is a need to evaluate these findings on which policy measures are
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effective in preventing informal self-employment in other global regions and individual
countries. Second, when conducting such research, it would be useful to investigate the
specific formal institutions in which a deficiency of trust exists (e.g. politicians, the judiciary,
tax administrations, labor inspectorates) to enable a better understanding of where trust-
building initiatives need to be targeted in terms of specific formal institutions. Third, future
research on horizontal trust could extend the analysis beyond the generalized trust examined
in this Eurobarometer survey to other measures of horizontal trust and social norms. One
limitation of the current study is that the dependent variable is positive for only just over 2%
of cases. It is far from obvious how this can be overcome in future studies since, unless the
whole adult population is studied, it is not possible to capture the full range of participants
engaged in informal self-employment. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, extensive
surveys will continue to be required.
In conclusion, if the study discussed in this paper leads to further evaluations of whether
trust-building is also relevant in other global regions and countries, then one intention will
have been achieved. If it also encourages governments in Europe and elsewhere to
transcend the currently dominant repressive policy approach based on detecting and
punishing those participating in informal self-employment and to move toward building
greater vertical and horizontal trust among this group, then the wider aim of this study will
have been achieved.
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